America’s gaggle of “Minuteman” long-range nuclear missiles went on line for the first time during the Cuban missile crisis in 1960. But the world was supposedly protected from mutual assured destruction by the “Permissive Action Links” (PALs) which required an 8-digit combination in order to launch. Robert McNamara, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, personally oversaw the installation of these special locks to prevent any unauthorized nuclear missile launches. He considered the safeguards to be essential for strict central control and for preventing nuclear disaster.
But what Secretary McNamara didn’t know is that from the very beginning, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha had decided that these locks might interfere with any wartime launch orders; so in order to circumvent this safeguard, they pre-set the launch code on all Minuteman silos to the same eight digits: 00000000.
For seventeen years, during the height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War, the code remained all zeros, and was even printed in each silo’s launch checklist for all to see. The codes remained this way up until 1977, when the service was pressed into activating the McNamara locks with real launch codes in place. Before that time, the the lack of safeguards would have made it relatively easy for a small group of rogue silo officers or visitors to implement an unauthorized nuclear missile launch.
From the Center for Defense Information article:
Technically, crew members can launch a nuclear attack with or without approval from higher authority. Unless PAL or its equivalent forecloses this option, as many as 50 missiles could be illicitly fired.
[…]
Military personnel, e.g. maintenance airmen, and civilian contractors who possessed minimal security credentials were granted LCC access, and annually thousands of visitors holding no clearance whatsoever were permitted access to operational LCCs. In the interest of public relations, the Air Force permitted ready access to the Minuteman launch network by practically anyone desiring it.
[…]
One must also recite the obvious point that silos and launch control centers are loated [sic] in desolate reaches of the heartland. Reaction times to mount a counterterror offensive pinpointed at one or a few of these facilities would be measured in hours, not minutes or seconds.
The men and women running SAC in 1960 essentially put the entire planet’s population at risk by deliberately disabling the PAL safety mechanisms. Perhaps we should keep that in mind before we put too much trust in the people charged with our nation’s defense.
anybody read about this?
anybody read about this?
or did geoff already post this in one of his doomsday sprees?
[url=http://profile.mygamercard.net/Emka+Jee][img]http://card.mygamercard.net/sig/Emka+Jee.jpg[/img][/url]
dunno how relevant it is, from a snopes forum post.The code input console's were supposed to be kept at 0000000 -- that is NOT the launch code itself. The rationale is that if they were always at 0 then everyone would know where to turn to get each number without having to think as much about it. That number did not enable or disable anything.
ow gosh i remember this from primary school.. oh the boredom..
there was this story with a women of <insert number i dun remember> who went to the movies with a guy of <insert> and after <insert> minutes the following happened. and if you add those numbers while telling the story 50753078 was the answer.
holy shit no one here will understand.
there was this story with a women of <insert number i dun remember> who went to the movies with a guy of <insert> and after <insert> minutes the following happened. and if you add those numbers while telling the story 50753078 was the answer.
holy shit no one here will understand.
hehe, that's what I put in my post.Zyte wrote:ow gosh i remember this from primary school.. oh the boredom..
there was this story with a women of <insert number i dun remember> who went to the movies with a guy of <insert> and after <insert> minutes the following happened. and if you add those numbers while telling the story 50753078 was the answer.
holy shit no one here will understand.
It wasn't exactly hard, as the numbers were literally the numbers you find in the 50753078 thing. This is how I remember it:
A man of 50 and a woman of 75 went to the movies. The tickets cost 30 euros. What happened between 7 and 8?
yeah i came to think about it because of ur post. look what the internet gave me: http://www.paranoid.demon.nl/34=he.htmlEraser wrote:hehe, that's what I put in my post.
It wasn't exactly hard, as the numbers were literally the numbers you find in the 50753078 thing. This is how I remember it:
A man of 50 and a woman of 75 went to the movies. The tickets cost 30 euros. What happened between 7 and 8?
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eepberries
- Posts: 1975
- Joined: Mon Jan 24, 2005 10:14 pm
Re: anybody read about this?
This is a load of bullshit. My uncle dealt with tons of missiles back in the when he was working for the government. He had something to do with coming in and doing repairs and part replacements. I talked with him about this once, it was pretty cool. But basically, the security of these sites was incredibly high. Anyone who climbed the fence would be arrested and imprisoned if caught. The only people even allowed into the heart of the facility itself were only those qualified to be there. The only people allowed in were only those who were supposed to be there. Each crew member and inspector has handguns on their belts, and were to kill anyone who did something they weren't supposed to do. An example is if one person is supposed to move part A down into the facility, that is all they do. If they so much as tuch another part or do something else while in the facility, they would be shot. If two people working on something were having a problem, nobody else could help them. The workers did specifically what they were supposed to do, and doing anything else would result in being shot by the facility crew and the inspection team.Before that time, the the lack of safeguards would have made it relatively easy for a small group of rogue silo officers or visitors to implement an unauthorized nuclear missile launch.
From the Center for Defense Information article:
Technically, crew members can launch a nuclear attack with or without approval from higher authority. Unless PAL or its equivalent forecloses this option, as many as 50 missiles could be illicitly fired.
[…]
Military personnel, e.g. maintenance airmen, and civilian contractors who possessed minimal security credentials were granted LCC access, and annually thousands of visitors holding no clearance whatsoever were permitted access to operational LCCs. In the interest of public relations, the Air Force permitted ready access to the Minuteman launch network by practically anyone desiring it.
[…]
One must also recite the obvious point that silos and launch control centers are loated [sic] in desolate reaches of the heartland. Reaction times to mount a counterterror offensive pinpointed at one or a few of these facilities would be measured in hours, not minutes or seconds.
The men and women running SAC in 1960 essentially put the entire planet’s population at risk by deliberately disabling the PAL safety mechanisms. Perhaps we should keep that in mind before we put too much trust in the people charged with our nation’s defense.
Honestly, there's absolutely no way the security on who was allowed on and in the facilities was anywhere near as lax as this is making it out to be. I wouldn't really know about the rest of it though
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eepberries
- Posts: 1975
- Joined: Mon Jan 24, 2005 10:14 pm
