Quake3World

America’s gaggle of “Minuteman” long-range nuclear missiles went on line for the first time during the Cuban missile crisis in 1960. But the world was supposedly protected from mutual assured destruction by the “Permissive Action Links” (PALs) which required an 8-digit combination in order to launch. Robert McNamara, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, personally oversaw the installation of these special locks to prevent any unauthorized nuclear missile launches. He considered the safeguards to be essential for strict central control and for preventing nuclear disaster.

But what Secretary McNamara didn’t know is that from the very beginning, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in Omaha had decided that these locks might interfere with any wartime launch orders; so in order to circumvent this safeguard, they pre-set the launch code on all Minuteman silos to the same eight digits: 00000000.

For seventeen years, during the height of the nuclear crises of the Cold War, the code remained all zeros, and was even printed in each silo’s launch checklist for all to see. The codes remained this way up until 1977, when the service was pressed into activating the McNamara locks with real launch codes in place. Before that time, the the lack of safeguards would have made it relatively easy for a small group of rogue silo officers or visitors to implement an unauthorized nuclear missile launch.

From the Center for Defense Information article:

Technically, crew members can launch a nuclear attack with or without approval from higher authority. Unless PAL or its equivalent forecloses this option, as many as 50 missiles could be illicitly fired.
[…]
Military personnel, e.g. maintenance airmen, and civilian contractors who possessed minimal security credentials were granted LCC access, and annually thousands of visitors holding no clearance whatsoever were permitted access to operational LCCs. In the interest of public relations, the Air Force permitted ready access to the Minuteman launch network by practically anyone desiring it.
[…]
One must also recite the obvious point that silos and launch control centers are loated [sic] in desolate reaches of the heartland. Reaction times to mount a counterterror offensive pinpointed at one or a few of these facilities would be measured in hours, not minutes or seconds.
The men and women running SAC in 1960 essentially put the entire planet’s population at risk by deliberately disabling the PAL safety mechanisms. Perhaps we should keep that in mind before we put too much trust in the people charged with our nation’s defense.

The code input console's were supposed to be kept at 0000000 -- that is NOT the launch code itself. The rationale is that if they were always at 0 then everyone would know where to turn to get each number without having to think as much about it. That number did not enable or disable anything.

Dr_Watson wrote:heh, i would have made the code 77345993 that way if somoene turned the LCD upside-down it said eggshell.

Eraser wrote:

Dr_Watson wrote:heh, i would have made the code 77345993 that way if somoene turned the LCD upside-down it said eggshell.

707

Zyte wrote:ow gosh i remember this from primary school.. oh the boredom..

there was this story with a women of <insert number i dun remember> who went to the movies with a guy of <insert> and after <insert> minutes the following happened. and if you add those numbers while telling the story 50753078 was the answer.

holy shit no one here will understand.

Eraser wrote:hehe, that's what I put in my post.
It wasn't exactly hard, as the numbers were literally the numbers you find in the 50753078 thing. This is how I remember it:

A man of 50 and a woman of 75 went to the movies. The tickets cost 30 euros. What happened between 7 and 8?

Before that time, the the lack of safeguards would have made it relatively easy for a small group of rogue silo officers or visitors to implement an unauthorized nuclear missile launch.

From the Center for Defense Information article:

Technically, crew members can launch a nuclear attack with or without approval from higher authority. Unless PAL or its equivalent forecloses this option, as many as 50 missiles could be illicitly fired.
[…]
Military personnel, e.g. maintenance airmen, and civilian contractors who possessed minimal security credentials were granted LCC access, and annually thousands of visitors holding no clearance whatsoever were permitted access to operational LCCs. In the interest of public relations, the Air Force permitted ready access to the Minuteman launch network by practically anyone desiring it.
[…]
One must also recite the obvious point that silos and launch control centers are loated [sic] in desolate reaches of the heartland. Reaction times to mount a counterterror offensive pinpointed at one or a few of these facilities would be measured in hours, not minutes or seconds.
The men and women running SAC in 1960 essentially put the entire planet’s population at risk by deliberately disabling the PAL safety mechanisms. Perhaps we should keep that in mind before we put too much trust in the people charged with our nation’s defense.

Eraser wrote:A man of 50 and a woman of 75 went to the movies. The tickets cost 30 euros. What happened between 7 and 8?

eepberries wrote:

Eraser wrote:A man of 50 and a woman of 75 went to the movies. The tickets cost 30 euros. What happened between 7 and 8?

"Bloeslos"?