The impending execution of Stanley "Tookie" Willia

[Canis]

Neuroimaging data is not behavioral in the same sense that cognition is behavioral.

never said that cognition is behavioural (although I do try to argue in another paper that defining cognition suffers somewhat similar problems to defining behaviour).

What i said was that introspective data should be considered behavioural data (this is one of the points i argue for in the essay). Another upshot of this argument is that neuroimaging data can be considered behavioural data.

However, I'd argue that the empirical nature of the MRI scans is upheld over introspection because of how quantifiable it is. Each image is a hard-set data point with values that can be measured and compared against each other without bias, regardless of when the analysis is performed. I believe with introspection comes a great deal of bias (or rather I cannot fully separate the two). Reflection, even on a written introspective thought, brings about interpretation from one's current mindset and biases the previous thoughts.

These are good points, and are addressed in the paper

I’ve got some scattered thoughts about your paper.

Early on you mention, "Thus behaviour, broadly construed, can be understood as the physical state, or change of state, in an organism. According to this definition the opening of ion channels in the kidneys as well as neural activity within the brain are candidates for behaviour."

It seems you have an almost too broad definition of behavior by seeing it as just a change in state of anything instead of having some intent or purpose that is governed by a strive for equilibrium or overcoming an obstacle to achieve a goal. You make the argument that introspection is a behavior because it constitutes such a change (since before and after the introspection some change has been made on some physiological level), but that doesnt necessarily equate it to all kinds of behaviors. I think for more validity the argument should separate various behaviors (simple, such as behavior of an ion channel; complex, such as alpha dominance in a herd; process-oriented, as in a series of events reaching equilibrium – processes within a cell, for example; or goal-orientated, indicating consciousness; etc.). For example, I think its a far stretch to show a link between the "behavior" of a pulley that's sqeaking because it hasnt been oiled, and the "behavior" of a hungry coyote.

You say introspection is a source of behavioral data in that it, similar to speech and movement, is an indicator of mental/cognitive activity, and as such can be used in a similar manner as speech and movement to derive conclusions about mental processes. While I cannot deny this is a possibility, I find it subject to a major source of error being based around how one would measure introspective thought. We have no empirical measurement for thought, and can only interpret it. There is no machine complex enough to give an unchanging data point that defines the state of a given thought, and as such we cannot compare thoughts to each other empirically. There is value to interpreting thought patterns as we perceive them, but I believe they will always be biased by this perception, whereas true empirical data does not have the bias of perception. Any bias should be relatively static (as in instrumental limitations or calibrations that could narrow the scope of what can be measured).

In your paper you mention, “It may indeed be the case that between two individuals, or within the same individual at different times, different colours may be perceived given the same pattern of receptor activity; but this would be explained in terms of other physical factors such as differing brain structures (due to genetics or plasticity).”

You might also add habituation, acclimation, etc., to this argument, since current experiences do affect our perceptions, be them behavioral or cellular (unless you assumed this in mentioning “plasticity”). For example, someone who’s depressed may interpret things differently, but also someone who’s been staring at a red wall will have habituated the neural pathways responsible for transducing red light signals, and when that person looks at another color they will have a different perception of it as a result (regardless of their mental state).

Lastly, I do have a problem with (at least my understanding of) your “intuitive resonance” idea in how you pertain it to science. Such thought is not something that’s taken well in science. Its not seen as good science by the scientific community to formulate conclusion based on something that “sounds right” or has any interpretation beyond a testable phenomenon that shows a specific, and predictable behavior. The tough thing is for practices that are tough to get true empirical data from, such as a psychological interpretation of one’s thoughts, in order to communicate them one has to prescribe to intuition and “human nature” logic as is developed by one’s experiences in order to have an understandable message.

Still, some of the arguments you put forth are very interesting, and I agree with viewing any behavior (as you define it) as an indicator of a mental process on some level. The problem is limiting where we can place these “behaviors” and what limit we put on them for determining how they influence other types of behaviors. Can we say that because one neuron behaves in a different biochemical manner that someone will think differently, leading to introspective differences that would indicate a similar conclusion about that person’s neuroanatomical makeup? Or better yet, given a neuron that has a defect but evokes a compensatory mechanism to overcome that defect, can we also bridge the same gap?

[Foo]

BTW on the subject of Tookie's crimes, Ogrish has crime scene photos.

Whether the graphic nature of the images is something that should be validly added into the debate, I dunno... but since war debate would legitimately include exposure to graphic scenes of the horrors of war, I think it fits.

[[xeno]Julios]

First off, i really appreciate the feedback

Early on you mention, "Thus behaviour, broadly construed, can be understood as the physical state, or change of state, in an organism. According to this definition the opening of ion channels in the kidneys as well as neural activity within the brain are candidates for behaviour."

It seems you have an almost too broad definition of behavior by seeing it as just a change in state of anything instead of having some intent or purpose that is governed by a strive for equilibrium or overcoming an obstacle to achieve a goal.

This is precisely because I couldn't find a consistent definition of behaviour that excluded "any physical changes". A strive for equilibrium is too vague, and goal achievement is too bound up with notions of intentionality and consciousness. For example, we talk of rapid eye movements as being sleep behaviours - but the movement of an eye during sleep isn't really a goal oriented phenomenon. More importantly, the eye movements, whether or not we define them as behaviour, are an observable phenomenon which has the potential of yielding insights into the way the body works.

You make the argument that introspection is a behavior because it constitutes such a change (since before and after the introspection some change has been made on some physiological level), but that doesnt necessarily equate it to all kinds of behaviors. I think for more validity the argument should separate various behaviors (simple, such as behavior of an ion channel; complex, such as alpha dominance in a herd; process-oriented, as in a series of events reaching equilibrium – processes within a cell, for example; or goal-orientated, indicating consciousness; etc.). For example, I think its a far stretch to show a link between the "behavior" of a pulley that's sqeaking because it hasnt been oiled, and the "behavior" of a hungry coyote.

Yes, this is an excellent point. There are levels of complexity involved in different behaviours. I would argue that introspective data (in the form of recorded language) is one of the most complex behaviours out there. It exists on a higher level of complexity than the mere physical functioning of a single neuron.

You say introspection is a source of behavioral data in that it, similar to speech and movement, is an indicator of mental/cognitive activity, and as such can be used in a similar manner as speech and movement to derive conclusions about mental processes. While I cannot deny this is a possibility, I find it subject to a major source of error being based around how one would measure introspective thought.

So we agree so far that it is in principle a form of information that may give clues as to our cognitive processes.

We have no empirical measurement for thought, and can only interpret it. There is no machine complex enough to give an unchanging data point that defines the state of a given thought, and as such we cannot compare thoughts to each other empirically.

A similar point could be made about interpreting higher level behaviours of the organism, such as emergent properties of complex systems like the immunological system, or of brain functioning that exists on higher levels of organization. It is true that we might not have a rigorous account of the causal mechanisms involved from the lower levels leading to the higher levels, but that doesn't mean that the evidence we have is useless.

There is value to interpreting thought patterns as we perceive them, but I believe they will always be biased by this perception, whereas true empirical data does not have the bias of perception.

But I deny the distinction between true empirical data and introspective data. Yes there is a difference when we are introspecting ourselves and just experiencing the raw experience (whatever that means). But if we collect linguistic accounts of a large number of subjects under controlled conditions, then this is genuine empirical data.

The more number of subjects we use, and the more we develop our experimental paradigms of introspection, the easier it is to derive higher quality inferences. For example, see the tip-of-the-tongue example i gave in the essay.

Any bias should be relatively static (as in instrumental limitations or calibrations that could narrow the scope of what can be measured).

Bias is never static when it comes to interpretation. With lower level behavioural phenomena such as measuring the electromagnetic properties of neural messengers, we are simply asking for a measurement. With higher level behavioural data, such as the kinematics of a limb movement, we are asking how those kinematics can be explained by the interaction of a system of neural activity combined with our muscles. This is why we have a theoretical dialogue surrounding such interpretations. New models are popping up, which purport to better explain the data. Introspective data is no different - we can develop models to better explain the data.

In your paper you mention, “It may indeed be the case that between two individuals, or within the same individual at different times, different colours may be perceived given the same pattern of receptor activity; but this would be explained in terms of other physical factors such as differing brain structures (due to genetics or plasticity).”

You might also add habituation, acclimation, etc., to this argument, since current experiences do affect our perceptions, be them behavioral or cellular (unless you assumed this in mentioning “plasticity”). For example, someone who’s depressed may interpret things differently, but also someone who’s been staring at a red wall will have habituated the neural pathways responsible for transducing red light signals, and when that person looks at another color they will have a different perception of it as a result (regardless of their mental state).

Yes, by plasticity this is what I meant. The sentence that followed that was key:

"Either way it is implausible that two different colours would be perceived given the same physical state of the entire organism; and if one buys into this implausibility then one is implicitly committed to the possibility of introspection as being a conceivable source of behavioural data.1"

Lastly, I do have a problem with (at least my understanding of) your “intuitive resonance” idea in how you pertain it to science. Such thought is not something that’s taken well in science.

Yes it is currently fashionable for many scientists to disregard such notions. However, if you read any thinkers like William James (considered one of the fathers of psychology), many of his insights came through introspective methods.

The example of Tulving (considered the father of memory research - the guy's probably up for a nobel prize in the near future) is also relevant, considering his theory of episodic memory is almost entirely based on such notions.

It is a fallacy to assume that science progresses in an introspective vacuum. We dont' formally recognize the influence of such processes, when evaluating ideas, but these influences do exist, and indeed can serve to guide (or misguide us).

An example of such research is one that I'm researching right now. It's called the SNARC effect, and it's based on the idea that we associate low numbers with left, and high numbers with right (assuming we've been conditioned with the western writing system). Out of all the subjects I have run, only one of them didn't find this idea resonant, and the data do indeed confirm the effect.

Its not seen as good science by the scientific community to formulate conclusion based on something that “sounds right” or has any interpretation beyond a testable phenomenon that shows a specific, and predictable behavior.

This is why we talk of convergence between different behavioural data. We already use neuroimaging data to converge with limb movement data. And in fact, we already use introspective data in the form of specific types of questionnaires during experiments: i.e. in measuring emotional states we ask "how did you feel on a scale of 1-10" and converge that with neuroimaging data and autonomic responses.

Now I would agree with your points if by introspective data one meant:

"How do you think your mind performs this task" and ask many different subjects and then make a conclusion.

There are many different forms of introspective exercises which result in behavioural data.

Memory tasks themselves are introspective data! When we ask someone to remember what was presented and in what order, we are asking them to access their own thoughts, and produce speech patterns in response. The conditions are highly controlled since the responses are constrained and can be matched with the stimuli, but it is still based on introspection!

This is the sort of insight I am getting at here. It is in reaction to the dogmatic attitude of many scientists (though not all - apparently some psychology departments like McGill are more focused on introspective paradigms) who claim that introspective data is fundamentally different, and inferior, to "behavioural" data.

The irony and beauty is that this argument becomes more convincing once we view the subject as a behavioural entity functioning within a materialist framework. We need not even assume these subjects are conscious - we could just consider their behaviour to be their speech patterns, given the conditions of the experiment (which include the stimulus of task instructions).

Still, some of the arguments you put forth are very interesting, and I agree with viewing any behavior (as you define it) as an indicator of a mental process on some level. The problem is limiting where we can place these “behaviors” and what limit we put on them for determining how they influence other types of behaviors.

I would say that we should recognize the weaknesses of introspective data (the behaviour is on a high layer of complexity, and thus inferring underlying models can be very tricky), and the strengths (they do provide something of a direct glimpse into the mind, since language behaviour is a cognitive phenomenon), and use the data responsibly.

But I strongly disagree that introspective data should simply be ignored. Introspective data can just be considered as the way our language cortices output information from other areas of the brain. It is relevant data, but must be interpreted in a responsible and qualified manner.

[Hannibal]

Q: What does one behaviorist say to another when they meet on the street?
A: You're fine. How am I?
Q: What does one behaviorist say to another after sex?
A: That was great for you. How was it for me?

Jules, I've not read your paper (I may or may not depending on my free time this evening) but could you tell me how much your argument depends on (what seems to me) logical behaviorism?

This passage caught my eye:

The irony and beauty is that this argument becomes more convincing once we view the subject as a behavioural entity functioning within a materialist framework. We need not even assume these subjects are conscious - we could just consider their behaviour to be their speech patterns, given the conditions of the experiment (which include the stimulus of task instructions).

Are you simply using it as a kind of heuristic device in this context or or does it take on a stronger role (i.e., methodological maxim) in your paper?

[[xeno]Julios]

What i'm saying is that we could view subjects as machines which respond to stimuli.

For example, as a stimulus, we could pinch subjects arses with varying degrees of force, and see how far they jump.

Or, as a stimulus, we could give them instructions which ask them to perform certain types of introspective tasks, and monitor their behavioural responses (in the form of language patterns).

This is the general idea in its simplest form.

p.s. love those jokes

[Hannibal]

not sure what the methodological maxim's all about, but what i'm saying is that we could view subjects as machines which respond to stimuli.

For example, as a stimulus, we could pinch subjects arses with varying degrees of force, and see how far they jump.

Or, as a stimulus, we could give them instructions which ask them to perform certain types of introspective tasks, and monitor their behavioural responses (in the form of language patterns).

I read your paper. Two questions: what (exactly) do you mean by 'cognitive model'? And what's the point of this type of research...why might it be worthwhile (I mean besides making the use of introspective 'data' more acceptable to the 'hard science' crowd)?

[[xeno]Julios]

what (exactly) do you mean by 'cognitive model'?

In the broadest sense, it's basically an information processing model which we use to explain human behaviour.

They can actually be represented schematically, with input boxes, and transformation arrows, etc.

Examples of competing cognitive models can be found in memory research.

Here's a quick example i found on google:



http://www.longleaf.net/ggrow/Strategic ... Model.html

And what's the point of this type of research...why might it be worthwhile (I mean besides making the use of introspective 'data' more acceptable to the 'hard science' crowd)?

To gain insight into how the mind works. I'm not arguing for the use of introspection as a sole means for this, anymore than i'd argue for the use of neuroimaging data as a sole means. I'm also reacting against scientists who claim introspective data is fundamentally different, or inferior, to "empirical" data, by showing

1) there is no fundamental difference
2) we already tacitly use different forms of introspective data.

[Freakaloin]

I just finished listening to the democracynow interview that was recorded a few weeks before his death. I realized something in this interview, and that is despite his crimes, and regardless of his innocence, there is a lot that could be learned from this man. I dont know if his efforts are a cover-up of sorts, but his demeanor and the messages he put out show he's very wise to both the justice system as well as street life and the street social system. I think in this case his death took away potential progress from all his efforts. If he were to be behind bars for the rest of his life writing his books and communicating the messages he's been communicating then that's almost a valuable thing, regardless of the extent of its impact on the world. I think such contributive benefits should also be taken into account with respect to the death penalty. Killing him took away a potentially valuable perspective on criminal life. Many other criminals, however, do not show such change. Still, I think a psychology panel should be employed to help assess these behaviors and see if they're truly sincere. I cannot be certain, as for me there's still the possibility that he's hiding his true guilt behind all these progresses and bolstering them in order to hopefully overshadow his crimes.

this is quite possibly the dumbest thing i have ever read...

[Foo]

ROFL boron alert!!!!!

[Hannibal]

To gain insight into how the mind works. I'm not arguing for the use of introspection as a sole means for this, anymore than i'd argue for the use of neuroimaging data as a sole means. I'm also reacting against scientists who claim introspective data is fundamentally different, or inferior, to "empirical" data, by showing

1) there is no fundamental difference
2) we already tacitly use different forms of introspective data.

Oi. I'm reminded again why I left psychology to all y'all. I know generally what a cognitive model is, I just thought that you may have had a particular formulation in mind when you wrote your paper.

You may find this page useful as a (philosophical) primer of what prompted my original question...an 'old wine in new bottles' type deal.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/b/behavior.htm

BTW, are there psychologists out there who actually think that introspective 'data' is NOT empirical? WTF?

[[xeno]Julios]

You may find this page useful as a (philosophical) primer of what prompted my original question...an 'old wine in new bottles' type deal.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/b/behavior.htm

Will check this out soon. Got a paper due tomorrow which I haven't started (gonna do it on the transcendental argument for the existence of god).

BTW, are there psychologists out there who actually think that introspective 'data' is NOT empirical? WTF?

Well you gotta understand the historical context. Introspection was a primary means to derive psychological insights. You'd have a few key thinkers who spent their energy delving into their own minds, and proclaiming certain things to be true about how the mind works. Think Wilhelm Wundt and William James.

Then the empiricists came along, and introspection went out of fashion.

I'm sure that many psychologists would admit that verbal data from introspecting subjects is empirical data, but i'm not sure that many scientists actually consider this possibility. To them, introspection entails sorta the stuff freud did - u know... do massive doses of cocaine, lie down and learn about how you oh so badly wanna fuck your mama.

(this is a crude historical account since i'm quite ignorant about the history).

[Hannibal]

BTW, are there psychologists out there who actually think that introspective 'data' is NOT empirical? WTF?

Well you gotta understand the historical context. Introspection was a primary means to derive psychological insights. You'd have a few key thinkers who spent their energy delving into their own minds, and proclaiming certain things to be true about how the mind works. Think Wilhelm Wundt and William James.

Then the empiricists came along, and introspection went out of fashion.


(this is a crude historical account since i'm quite ignorant about the history).

I'm actually aware of the historical context (I was Phd candidate in psychology before fucking off for good ). I'll just put it down to conceptual confusion--a conflation of 'empirical' with 'approved procedures of measurement' or something.

[[xeno]Julios]

yea - i think part of the resistance comes from the idea that raw experience is not publicly empirical.

True enough, and maybe i'm abusing the term "introspective data" when i claim it to be verbally recorded data of introspecting subjects.

But as you say, many would hold even verbal data to be "poor quality" empirical evidence.